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1Battered Birds and Crated Herds, How We Treat the Animals We Eat 4 (MBK Publishing 1996).
1Despite enormous strides in recent decades in the eld of animal rights and animal welfare, very little has been
accomplished with respect to preventing the systematic abuse and institutionalized cruelty towards animals
raised for food and food production. With the dominion of man over nonhuman animals (\animals")2
dating back to ancient times, perhaps there is nothing truly novel about the manner in which our society
treats farm animals. Perhaps current husbandry practices merely represent the extension of longstanding
beliefs and traditions. With the advent of industrialized agriculture and its attendant inhumane treatment
towards farm animals, however, the issue of the manner in which we treat the animals we eat has come to a
head. Laws protecting animals from abuse ostensibly exist at both state and federal levels, indicating broad
support for animal protection and societal concern for kind treatment of animals, and yet, this concern
generally does not extend to how our food gets to the dinner table. The substance of state and federal
animal welfare laws indicates a selective insensitivity to the welfare of farm animals. Many of the statutes
exempt actions that fall within acceptable animal husbandry methods, and others suer from inadequate
scope and improper enforcement, culminating in widespread acquiescence to a system contaminated by
large-scale institutionalized cruelty towards farming animal. With the instances of objectively cruel farming
practices snowballing under the pressure of an ever-growing, industrialized agriculture nation, driven by prot
and eciency, exposing such atrocities represents the rst step in determining what constitutes the proper
treatment of such animals. Our moral bells out to deafen our ears when faced with the troublesome irony
that current animal husbandry practices are objectively cruel, and yet, for the most part, neither violative
of state nor federal law. Although the basic construct of our Constitutional design and our history, aords
2As common vernacular dictates, and as used henceforth, \animal" will refer to nonhuman animals only. Nevertheless,
making such a distinction can be problematic. The classication of animals into two separate categories, human and nonhuman,
a concept termed `speciesism' by Richard Ryder and popularized by philosopher Peter Singer, describes the human tendency to
disassociate from other animals, thereby relieving themselves of the guilt of their actions resulting in the exploitation, suering
and death of nonhuman animals. Laura G. Kniaz, Comment, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground
Railroad, 43 Bu. L. Rev. 765, 768 (1995) (citing Lawrence Finsen & Susan Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America:
From Compassion to Respect 55 (1994)); Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 8 (2d ed. 1990). Peter Singer denes speciesism as
discriminating on the grounds of species membership alone, \a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members
of one's own species and against those of members of other species." Id. at 6 note 6. According to Singer, speciesism is akin
to discrimination based on race or sex (i.e., racism or sexism). Id. at 1-8.
2a certain latitude with respect to fundamental rights inherent in humans, the denial of basic fundamental
rights to sentient, living organisms deemed, in today's parlance, \nonhuman animals," inevitably sets a
dangerous precedent in a society that places the ultimate premium on liberties that apply equally across all
social barriers.
The notion of man's superior place in a dichotomy between human and nonhuman animals dates back to
our most ancient teachings, such that perhaps there is nothing truly novel about the absolute dominion of
man over animal. The history of the Western understanding of a hierarchical universe in which everything
fell along an immutable \Great Chain of Being" and was designed for the use of humans permeated through
ancient philosophies, justifying the denial of even the most fundamental rights to animals. Basically,
these ancients believed in \teleological anthropocentrism,"3 the idea that the outer physical
world had been designed, and that its Designer had created the world to serve humanity.
This designed world was populated, in theory, by an innite number of nely-graded forms,
immutably arranged in a hierarchical \Great Chain of Being" from the barely alive to the
sentient to the intellectual to the wholly spiritual.4 The \great and true Amphibium," the
rational human being, dwelt upon the topmost rung assigned to corporeal beings... 5
Socrates' friend Xenophon tells us that Socrates believed animals existed solely for the sake of humans.6
Plato imagined \a `principle of plenitude,' by which every conceivable form that could exist in the universe
did."7 Aristotle envisioned that all nature, and specically animals, existed and operated for the sole purpose
of mankind.8 These ancient Greek ideas fused into \one of the most potent and persistent presuppositions in
Western thought,"9 the \Great Chain of Being." The proposition that humans occupy such a superior place
in the universe serves as one of the fundamental tenets of \a Judeo-Christian world suckled on Genesis,"10
6Wise, Rattling the Cage, at 11 (citing, Xenophon, Recollections of Socrates, 4.3.9-10, at 115 (Anna S. Benjamin, Trans.
Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc. 1965)).
7Id. at 10 (citing, Lovejoy at 59, 242).
8Wise, How Animals Were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, at 21-23.
9Wise, Rattling the Cage, at 10 (citing, Lovejoy at viii). Lovejoy noted that up until about a century ago the notion was
probably the most widely familiar conception of the general scheme of things, of the constitutive pattern of the universe. Id.
10Id. at 17.
3uncontroverted, and apparently settled. The Great Chain metaphor resonates throughout Genesis, \God
said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the sh of the
sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing
that creepeth upon the earth."11 After the Flood, God, who had originally not permitted humans to kill
animals for food,12 bestowed upon Noah and his sons, \into your hand are they delivered, every moving
thing that liveth shall be meat for you...I have given you all things."13 St. Augustine of Hippo crystallized
these ancient beliefs, explaining that the commandment, \Thou shall not kill," applied only in respect to
other humans and any extension outside the human realm would have been preposterous.14 Unfortunately,
these opinions cannot be ascribed to the Ancients, as the prevalence of \teleological anthropocentric"15
paradigms in justifying historical and present treatment of animals by humans diused quite thoroughly into
contemporary Western common sense, paving the way for centuries of acquiesce towards the cruelty with
which we treat all animals, particularly farm animals.
As with many shameful episodes in our past, our moral alarm bells ought to deafen our ears when the
government claims the right to single out a group of individuals and suspend the great safeguards upon
which this nation was built and we ought to be doubly vigilant when this disadvantage is tied to a physical
or mental \condition" of the individual, for this ought to recall shameful epochs of our history when such
\dierences" were the bedrock on which legal disadvantages of all sorts were justied. American history,
replete with embarrassing rationalizations and denials of fundamental rights to certain individuals, should
11Genesis 1:28 (Authorized King James Version).
12Id. at 1:29.
13Id. at 9:1-3.
14Steven M. Wise, How Animals Were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, at 32.
15Animals were not the only victims of teleological anthropocentricism. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney alluded to the
Great Chain of Being when he declared that blacks had been \looked upon as so far below [whites] in the scale of created
beings." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 409 (1856)). Women were also considered to occupy an inferior place
in the Great Chain of Being; \[s]ome humans, males, free men, and adults, for example, occupied superior positions with respect
to others, such as females, slaves and children. Women, believed decient in reason and, in a sense, in justice, occupied a place
between men and nonhuman animals." Steven M. Wise, How Animals Were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, at 24-5.
4cause, at the very least, troubling hesitation when justifying the denials of basic rights to any sentient being.
In 1894, the California Supreme Court banned Chinese witnesses from testify in proceedings involving a white
person as a party, reasoning that the Chinese were a race of people \whom nature has marked as inferior,
and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point."16 The American
sentiment at the time being,
The same rule which would admit them to testify, would admit them to all the equal
rights of citizenship...This is not a speculation which exists in the excited and over-heated
imagination of the patriot and statesman, but it is an actual and present danger. The
anomalous spectacle of a distinct people, living in our community...bringing with them
their prejudices and national feuds, in which they indulge in open violation of law, whose
mendacity is proverbial; a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior...as their
history has shown; diering in language, opinions, color, and physical conformation; between
whom and ourselves nature has placed an impassable dierence, is now presented, and for
them is claimed, not only the right to swear away the life of a citizen, but the further
privilege of participating with us in administering the aairs of our Government.17
The perceived economic necessity of the institution of slavery underscored countless 19th century court
rulings and pervaded the common knowledge at the time. For example, the court in Mitchell v. Wells, after
denying the right of a freed slave to sue on his own behalf in a slave state by reasoning that the logical
conclusion of conferring such a right would be the extension of the same right to great apes,18 noted,
...[Mississippi's] climate, soil, and productions, and the pursuits of her people, their habits,
manners, and opinions, all combine not only to sanction the wisdom, humanity, and policy of
the [slave system] thus established by her organic law and fostered by her early legislation,
but they require slave labor. It was declared in the convention that framed the Federal
Constitution, by some of their delegates, that Georgia and South Carolina would become
barren wastes without slave labor... 19
Hindsight reveals, among other things, the falsity inherent in this logic. In addition to the perception that
slavery was an economic necessity, courts continued to proclaim that slavery was consistent with the natural
order of life.
16People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854)).
1837 Miss. 235 (1859).
5To inculcate care and industry upon the descendants of Ham, is to preach to the idle winds.
To be the \servant of servants" is the judicial curse pronounced upon their race. And this
Divine decree is unreversible. It will run on a parallel with time itself. And heaven and earth
shall sooner pass away, than one jot or tittle of it shall abate. Under the superior race and no
where else, do they attain to the highest degree of civilization; and any experiment, whether
made in the British West India Islands, the coast of Africa, or elsewhere, will demonstrate
that it is a vain thing for fanaticism, a false philanthropy, or anything else, to ght against
the Almighty. His ways are higher than ours; and humble submission is our best wisdom, as
well as our rst duty! Let our women and old men, and persons of weak and inrm minds,
be disabused of the false and unfounded notion that slavery is sinful, and that they will
peril their souls if they do not disinherit their ospring by emancipating their slaves!20
In the infamous Dred Scott decision, the United States Supreme Court declared in its now notorious holding
that a \[Negro] of the African race" was not a citizen of the United States because of the status of his race
at the time and the ratication of the United States Constitution. Blacks, then seen as \beings of an inferior
order...[so] far below [whites] in the scale of created beings...had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect...He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and trac, whenever
a prot could be made by it."21 In 1875, a unanimous Supreme Court of Wisconsin summarily denied a
woman's motion to practice before it, reasoning that the female practice of law was a \[departure] from the
order of nature," indeed \treason against it."22 The Court rationalized, \[t]he law of nature destines and
qualies the female sex for the bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the
homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women, inconsistent
with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession of law, are departures from the order
of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it..."23 Such shameful periods of our history should, at the
very least, warn us from the systematic denial of basic fundamental rights to any sentient beings.
In light of ancient Western teachings, perhaps the treatment of farm animals raised for food merely rep-
21Dred Scott at 403-409.
22In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875).
23Id. at 245.
6resents the natural extension of long-standing religious and philosophical beliefs. Yet, however cohesively
one's personal views, or even our historical identity, dovetails with the notion of man's superior place in
the universe, this paradigm at least fails to justify the current cruelty and abuse so prevalent in animal
husbandry practices. The emergence of the factory farm24 and the attendant mistreatment of farm animals
mark a pivotal and disturbing change from the traditional treatment of such animals. It was not always
this way. Before the 1940s, small-scale farms, principally managed by families, raised the majority of farm
animals used for food.25 These local farmers raised their relatively small herds of animals in simple outdoor
operations. These outdoor pastures not only ensured the animals received proper sunlight exposure and
daily Vitamin D supplements, but also that the animals had sucient physical space to live comfortably
while minimizing the threat of disease.26
The picture of the traditional, small scale, family-run farm has undergone a radical renovation in recent
time. Beginning around the 1940s, large corporations purchased a majority of available farmland, perma-
nently transforming farming into a large-scale business operation.27 \Nationwide, the corporate takeover of
traditional family practices is evidenced by the fact that ve corporations now control eighty-nine percent
of all beef processing operations and four companies control over half of all pork processing operations."28
Corporate farms have enjoyed rampant prosperity because \federal policy and market forces have favored
large-scale mechanized and capital-intensive farming as a means of ensuring cheap and plentiful food."29
24The concept of a \factory farm" is used quite loosely. Some dene it as \any commercial enterprise in which a large number
of live stock are raised in an intense environment other than the animals' natural habitat solely for the purpose of producing
food." Richard F. McCarthy & Richard E. Bennett, Statutory Protection for Farm Animals, 3 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 229, note
19 at 230 (1985). As such, the vast majority of \chickens, hogs, calves, and dairy cattle" raised in the United States would be
classied as factory farm products. Id.
25Nicole Fox, Comment and Note, The Inadequate Protection of Animals Against Cruel Animal Husbandry Practices Under
United States Law, 17 Whittier L. Rev. 145 (1995) (citing, Wayne Pacelle, Bio-Machines: Life on the Farm Ain't What it Used
to Be, 137 Vegetarian Times 30, 31 (1989)).
26Id.
27Id.
28Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding Operations: Concerns, Limits, and Options
for Southeastern States, 6 Envtl. Law. 503, 512 (2000) (citing, Center for Rural Aairs, Corporate Farming and Industrialization
(visited Feb. 1, 2000) <http:// www.cfra.org/Issues.htm>).
29Fox at 145 (quoting, Steve Lustgarden, The High Price of Cheap Food: Consumers{and Family Farms{Are the Losers As
Factory Farms Take Over, 205 Vegetarian Times, 72, 73 (1994)).
7Incredibly, \[w]hile nationwide the production of livestock and poultry has remained relatively constant or
increased steadily, the number of farms has decreased dramatically, leading to a concentration of a large
number of animals on a decreasing number of farms."30 For example, while the number of hogs produced
annually has remained virtually constant over the past fteen years, the number of farms has dropped by
seventy-six percent, from 600,000 to 157,000.31 Similarly, \in the cattle industry, forty percent of all cattle
produced come from just two percent of the feeding operations."32 The poultry business exhibits similar
consolidation trends \with poultry production almost tripling between 1969 and 1992, while the number
of broiler production farms fell by thirty-ve percent over the same period."33 The consolidation of the
farming industry and its concentration in corporate hands transformed the American farming practice into
an industrialized nation of agribusinesses.
The relatively recent shift from smaller, family-owned and operated farms to larger corporate factory farms
arguably yields a variety of social and economic benets.34 At the same time, however, factory farming sys-
tems have largely eroded free-market incentives to consider the welfare of farm animals in food production.
No economic principles call for the protection of farm animals from abuse. As a result, in order to remain
competitive, farmers generally implement husbandry techniques that enhance productivity without regard
for their eect on farm animals. Not surprisingly, institutionalized mistreatment of today's farm animals
is inextricably linked to the objectives that pioneered the shift from traditional, small-scale family farms
30Head at 511.
31Id. (citing, Minority Sta, Senate Comm. On Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 105th Cong., Animal Waste Pollution in
America: An Emerging National Problem 15 (1997)).
32Id.
33Id.
34Critics of corporate farming often argue that despite potential short-term monetary benets, rural communities ultimately
will suer as factory farms force small producers out of business and that the dominance of factory farms will degrade fragile
ecosystems by concentrating the release of animal waste into the environment. John D. Burns, Comment, The Eight Million
Little Pigs|A Cautionary Tale: Statutory and Regulatory Responses to Concentrated Hog Farming, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev.
851, 856-58 (1996). Critics of factory farms argue that the concentration of huge numbers of animals not only leads to
environmental problems but also to the loss of the family farm and the rural way of life. Eric Voogt, Pork, Pollution, and Pig
Farming: The Truth About Corporate Hog Production in Kansas, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 219, 220 (1996) (discussing the
environmental, social, and economic issues associated with corporate ownership of farms and noting that the debate has been
labeled agriculture's \abortion ght" in the Midwest).
8to giant, corporate factory farms, namely eorts to lower production costs, increase eciency, maximize
corporate prots, and generate cheaper food products for society.35 As the American agricultural commer-
cial enterprise system ourishes, with new technologies implemented in the name of prot and eciency,
systematic abuse of farm animals will continue to plague the industry.
As large-scale farming operations subordinate animal welfare to pecuniary concerns, the question of what
constitutes tolerable conditions in which the animals are reared and slaughtered must be addressed. Corpo-
rate farms raise animals through intensive connement methods as a means of capitalizing on the use of land
and space in order to maximize corporate prots.36 Farm animal connement conditions meet the demands
of prot and eciency through this use of small, overcrowded cages often with a single farmer raising over
ve million animals.37 Generally, an intensive farming operation is an \enclosed, conned building where
feeding, watering and waste disposal are conducted in an automated or semi-automated manner."38 Such
assembly line, factory-like conditions force farm animals \to live stressful, sickly and grotesquely inhumane
existences."39 For example, a large percentage of pigs are produced in \total connement operations," \a
system in which an animal is `born, weaned, and \nished" (fed for market)' in buildings that have `auto-
matic feeding, watering, manure removal, and environmental control' features." 40 Each year in the U.S.,
nearly 100 million pigs are raised and slaughtered, most born to sows in farrowing crates.41
35David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of Animals Raised for Food or Food Production,
2 Animal L. 123, 146 (1996)).
36Fox at 145-6 (citing, Amy Blount Achor, Animal Rights: A Beginner's Guide 78 (1992)).
37Id. at 146 (citing, Wayne Pacelle at 32).
38Steven J. Havercamp, Are Moderate Animal Welfare Laws and a Substainable Agricultural Economy Mutually Exclusive?
Laws, Moral Implications, and Recommendations, 46 Drake L. R. 645, 650 note 19 (1998) (quoting, Richard F. McCarthy &
Richard E. Bennett, Statutory Protection for Farm Animals, 3 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 229, 230 (1985)).
39Fox at 146.
40Havercamp at 659 (citing, Jim Mason & Peter Singer, Animal Facotries 8 (1980)).
41Battered Birds and Crated Herds at 19.
9Modern breeding sows are treated like piglet-making machines and live a continuous cycle of
impregnation and birth...After being impregnated, sows are conned in small pens or metal
gestation crates which are just two feet wide. At the end of their gestation period, sows are
transferred to farrowing crates where they barely have room to stand or lie down. They are
denied straw bedding and lie on hard oors [because the straw is too expensive.]...After
giving birth and nursing their young for two weeks...the sow is reimpregnated. Hog factories
keep their sows \100% active"...[until] sent to slaughter.42
As babies, the pigs' tails are removed without anesthesia to minimize the instances of tail-biting, an aberrant
behavior occurring when these highly intelligent animals are kept in depraved factory farm environments,
and notches are similarly cut from their ears for identication purposes.43 At two or three weeks of age, the
piglets are taken away from their mothers, fteen percent of whom will have already died in the farrowing
crates, and placed in crowded nursery \pens" with metal bars and concrete oors, and as they grow they
will be moved to \grower" and then \nisher" houses, and nally slaughtered at six months when they reach
250 pounds.44 A Pulitzer Prize winning series described the increasingly popular, intensive connement,
technique of producing pork through large-scale swine production facilities:
Holding Pens: Sows spend...their lives in narrow metal [farrowing] crates barely larger than
their bodies. The animal stands on a steel grate that allows waste to fall into the waste
through. Food is dispensed through the overhead distribution system and water is available
on demand through a tube connected to an overhead water line. During hot weather water
is dripped onto the hogs to cool them. The farrowing pen has a cradling device that prevents
the sow from crushing the piglets.45 Breeders: Sows are mated or articially inseminated
under close supervision. After about two years, or whenever their reproductive performance
declines, they are killed. Pigs: Piglets are weaned at about 21 days and trucked rst to
nursery farms. At about 50 pounds they are taken to nishing farms where they are grown
on a scientically proportioned diet of corn, soybeans and supplements. Going to market:
After about six months the hogs have grown to roughly 240 pounds, and their ability to
convert feed into muscle peaks. The hogs are loaded into trucks and taken to packing houses
for slaughter. [The] standard sow barn used... measures 340 by 60 feet and holds 1,076 sow
crates. All the animals are fed, watered, heated and cooled through automated systems.
The wastes drop through slots in the oor and are ushed out of the barns with water
recycled from the lagoons....The process is ecient and as a result, \thousands of lean,
carbon-copy hogs [are] produced at the least possible cost." Signicantly, the current trend
of pork being produced in large-scale swine facilities shows little sign of subsiding.46
43Id.
44Id.
10The swine factory air that the hogs breathe their entire lives, laden with dust, dander and noxious gases
produced by the animals' urine and feces, causes respiratory disease in a large percentage of the animals.47
As such, modern hog factories run rampant with a variety of transmittable diseases. Rather than a few
hundred hogs in an outdoor pasture, modern large-scale swine facilities, where a large number of animals
are raised in concentrated areas resembling manufacturing plants, exemplify the massive technological and
eciency advances in agriculture in recent years, 48 rendering today's farms industrialized businesses and
today's farmland a nation of agribusinesses.
Along with the unbelievably inhumane, over-crowded, prison-like, living conditions of today's factory farms,
a tremendous amount of additional, equally unspeakable, often ignored cruelties are inicted upon today's
farm animals. Perhaps most disturbing, however, is that all this occurs while regulation of animal husbandry
practices ostensibly claims to protect farm animals from unnecessary suering. But, full of many loopholes
and deciencies, these animal welfare regulations with respect to farming practices only create an atmosphere
of indierence and acceptance of such cruelties. With most Americans turning both a blind eye and a deaf ear
towards animal husbandry practices, answering the question what constitutes tolerable conditions for farm
animals, necessitates exposing, in detail, the deplorable conditions under which the animals we eventually
eat suer.
Animals are cognitive, sentient beings capable of varying levels of pain and suering, particularly higher-
evolved species.49 The illusion that animal lack the capacity to feel pain or lack the ability to have thoughts
and feelings makes it much easier for humans to exploit animals.50 Those arguing that such animals neither
47Battered Birds and Crated Herds at 19.
48Havercamp at 653-4.
49See Margaret Rose & David Adams, Evidence for Pain and Suering in Other Animals, in Animal Experimentation: The
Consensus Changes 42 (Gill Langley ed., 1989) (discussing animal pain, suering, and anxiety). See also, Patrick P.G. Bateson,
Assessment of Pain in Animals, 42 Animal Behav. 827 (1991); David DeGrazia & Andrew Rowan, Pain, Suering, and Anxiety
in Animals and Humans, 12 Theoretical Med. 193 (1991).
50Marc Beko, Essay: Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, or Something Else? \Do Dogs Ape?" Or \Do Apes Dog?" And Does
11feel pain nor suer might pause to \recall that until recently, many doctors believed that human newborns
couldn't either and mercilessly operated on them without anesthesia."51 A \1977 study revealed that more
than half the children between the ages of four and eight months who had undergone major surgery were
given no medication for postoperative pain." Current medical knowledge on infant pain now warns, \humane
considerations should apply as forcefully to the care of...infants as they do to children and adults in similar
painful and stressful situations."52 In addition, like humans, it is not dicult to imagine animals suering
pain when they feel out of control, when the course of pain is unknown, when the meaning of the pain is
dire, or when the pain is apparently without end.53 Countless studies document animals' capacity to feel
pain and suering.
On June 19, 1997, the longest case in English court history, known throughout the world as \McLibel,"
nally concluded. After seven years from the service of initial writs and 313 days of trial, Judge Justice
Bell took two hours to read his summary of the verdict nding, in relevant part, the defendants correctly
stated that McDonalds (and, by inference, similar corporations)54 was culpably responsible for the large-
scale mistreatment of certain animals raised for food and food production in the United States and the
United Kingdom. 55 McDonalds sued Helen Steel and Dave Morris, claiming that Steel and Morris had
defamed them by asserting, among other things, that McDonalds was culpably responsible for cruel treatment
of animals in its common farming practices.56 While the defendants, a postman and gardener with a
It Matter? Broadening and Deepening Cognitive Theory, 3 Animal L. 13 (1997).
51Wise, Rattling the Cage, at 182 (quoting, Roselyn Rey, The History of Pain 293 (Harvard University Press 1998) (1993);
K.J.S. Anand and P.R. Hickey, \Pain and its Eects on the Human Neonate and Fetus," 316 New England Journal of Medicine
1321 (1987)).
52Id. (quoting, K.J.S. Anand and P.R. Hickey at 1326).
53Id. (citing, Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suering and the Goals of Medicine 32, 35, 36 (Oxford University Press 1991)
(reporting similar suering capacities in humans)).
54The plaintis were two huge corporations, McDonalds Corporation (U.S.) and McDonalds' British subsidiary, McDonald's
Restaurant Limited [hereinafter McDonalds]).
55David J. Wolfson, McLibel, 5 Animal L. 21, 21-22 (1999).
56McSpotlight (visited Feb. 1, 2001) <http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/index.html>.
12combined annual income of merely $12,000 U.S., represented themselves pro se, McDonalds spent over $16
million on its legal representation.57 Despite remarkable obstacles against them, the defendants received a
positive judgment with the judge nding so many common farming practices cruel and McDonalds culpably
responsible for them.58 Most signicantly, the McLibel decision exposed a disturbing contradiction: the court
had held that many common farming practices in the United States and the United Kingdom were cruel in
the view of a reasonable person and yet, at the same time, entirely legal.59 The unique legal context of the
McLibel decision with respect to animal law, specically animal cruelty law, yielded a groundbreaking holding
that represented \the most extensive and critical legal discussion in legal history about the inherent cruelty
in modern common farming practices."60 McLibel's distinct legal posture allowed the court to determine
whether, according to a reasonable person, common farming practices were cruel, a simple question that had
never before been so extensively addressed. The unique nature of the case allowed the court to rule on issues
relating to the treatment of farm animals that rarely, if ever, are subject to judicial scrutiny.
57Wolfson, McLibel, at 22 (citing, John Vidal, Empire of Burgers, The Guardian, June 27, 1997 (visited Apr. 29, 1999)
<http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/guardian 20jun97.html>).
58In addition to their vast nancial and legal disadvantage, the defendants faced numerous constraints. For example, McDon-
alds refused to allow the defendants to inspect any of its animal production or slaughter facilities; thus, most of the defendant's
evidence for animal cruelty had to be provided by McDonalds' own witnesses. Id. at 29 (quoting, Chief Justice Bell, Verdict
Section 11, The Rearing and Slaughtering of Animals, (visited Apr. 29, 1999) <http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/ ver-
dict/verdict jud2c.html> [hereinafter Opinion]). The one-sided nature of the circumstances surrounding the case only reinforces
and validates the ultimate judgment in the case and, at the same time, begs the question how much more might have been
proven about the cruel conditions farm animals endure had the playing eld been level.
59Id. at 23-4.
60Id. at 22.
13Historically, courts determine whether a common farming practice is cruel solely in the
context of the application and interpretation of anticruelty statutes. McLibel, however, was
founded in the civil tort of defamation. No court had ever examined the cruel treatment of
farm animals in this legal context. The legal posture of McLibel allowed a simple question
to be posed to the court that had never before been addressed. In a typical prosecution for
cruelty in relation to a common farming practice, the court must determine whether the
particular practice violates the statutory denition of cruelty. By contrast, in McLibel, Mr.
Justice Bell was asked to determine whether, according to a reasonable person, a common
farming practice was cruel. As McLibel demonstrates, the answers to these two questions
are not the same. In addition, because McLibel was grounded in the tort of defamation,
the court was able to examine evidence and rule on farming practices that would normally
not reach the court. The legal posture of defamation allowed the defendants to avoid
the multiple hurdles, obstacles, and barriers that face anyone who argues a cruel common
farming practice violates an anticruelty statute.61
Also, had Steel and Morris made these allegations in the United States as opposed to England, \McDonalds
likely would not have initiated suit. In England, the law presumes defamatory statements are false until
proven otherwise by the defendant, whereas, in the United States, the plainti has the burden of proving
defamatory statements false."62 Additionally, in the United States, the First Amendment of the Constitution
would have provided the defendants with free speech protection.63
In determining whether the methods by which animals were reared and slaughtered to make McDonalds'
food were cruel and inhumane, the court handed down the following judgments.64 As to the rst charge
regarding the rearing of animals raised for food, the court, after examining a number of common farming
practices, specically the egg-laying hens battery cage operations used in both the United States and the
United Kingdom, held that while \the evidence failed to demonstrate a chicken spending her whole life
without sunshine or fresh air was cruel...the severe restriction of movement caused by the battery cage,
whereby one bird is provided...an area about eight inches by eleven inches, was proven to be cruel."65 The
62Id. at 33 (quoting, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292) (1964)).
63Id. (noting, New York Times v. Sullivan at 286)).
64The court limited the trial's reach where it concluded that McDonalds had insucient inuence over certain industries to be
held vicariously liable for cruelty towards animals (i.e., the cattle rearing industries in the United States and United Kingdom
and the pig suppliers in the United States. The court found that these industries and suppliers existed in large numbers and
were well-established before McDonalds' existence and the defendants failed to show that McDonalds had sucient control to
demand practices be altered, even if they were cruel.) Id. at 37-8 (citing, Opinion at 7-8).
65Id. at 40 (citing, Opinion at 32).
14judge found,
[i]t seems to me that even the humble battery hen probably has some sentience, some power
of perception by its senses, of virtually total deprivation of all normal activities save eating,
drinking, some minimal movement, defecating and laying eggs, and that one in three or four
of them which suer broken bones on \harvesting" for slaughter must feel some signicant
pain. I conclude that the battery system as described to me is cruel in respect of the
almost total restraint of the birds and the incidence of broken bones when they are taken
for slaughter.66
Similarly, the judge found that while housing meat-producing broiler chickens in a broiler house for their
whole lives without access to open air or sunshine was not proven to be cruel, the severe space restrictions
these animals suered due to overstocking in their last few days prior to slaughter was also cruel.67 The
judge also noted,
grow[n] together as a \crop"...The sheer size of the system does not...appear to lend
itself to humane treatment...[Ultimately,] while I have felt unable to judge that broiler
house birds suer from dim light or inability to express what would be normal behavior in
other conditions, I do not consider that I am indulging in too much anthropocentrism in
judging them to be uncomfortable for the last few days...The high density is intentional
and unnecessary and it probably causes the birds some level of real discomfort.68
In terms of sows raised for pork in the United Kingdom, the judge found their restriction of movement
cruel.69 The sows are placed in \narrow metal barred stalls in which the sow can only stand up or lie down
and cannot turn around, with no access to open air and sunshine and without freedom of movement."70 The
judge further explained that, \[p]igs are intelligible and social animals and I have no doubt that keeping
[them] in dry sow stalls for extended periods is cruel."71 Remarkably, this practice, now illegal in the
United Kingdom, continues to be legal in the United States.72 The judge further noted that while \[t]here
may be cruel practices in relation to pigs which go for [McDonalds'] ...pork products in the U.S.,...I have
67Id. (citing, Opinion at 19, 21).
69Id. at 41(citing, Opinion at 44).
70Id. at note 150 (citing, Opinion at 44).
71Id. (citing, Opinion at 38).
72David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 141.
15insucient evidence to nd them."73 The court's ndings of cruelty, however, were entirely sucient to
justify the rst particular allegation by the defendants that McDonalds' farming methods subjected farm
animals to unnecessarily cruel and inhumane pain and suering during rearing.74
As to the defendants' allegations regarding McDonalds' cruelty towards animals in the process of slaughter,
the judge found the proof lacking with respect to the cruel circumstances surrounding the slaughter of cattle
and pigs in the United States and United Kingdom; however, he found animal cruelty in that frequently
chickens in the United States and United Kingdom are still fully conscious when they have their throats
cut.75 \Recognizing that between forty and one-hundred twenty birds each hour are fully conscious when
their throats are cut in the United Kingdom, the court found this practice to be `frequent....I judge neck
cutting while conscious cruel by modern standards. The whole purpose of stunning animals is to render them
unconscious and insentient before their throats are cut."'76 In the United States, chickens remain without
federal protection, as the pertinent statute, the Humane Slaughter Act77 specically exempts poultry, and
any state protection is generally insucient or not enforced.78 In addition, the judge noted that \signicant
evidence [had been presented] suggesting that many chickens, cows and pigs in the United States are fully
conscious when their throats are cut."79 The judge conceded that not all of the defendants specic allegations
had been proven true as a legal matter; however, sucient evidence had been shown \to justify the general
charge that both plaintis are culpably responsible for cruel practices in the rearing and slaughtering of
73Wolfson, McLibel, at 41 (citing, Opinion at 44).
74Id. (citing, Opinion at 50).
75Id. at 42 (citing, Opinion at 30, 41, 47, 48).
76Id. at 41 (citing, Opinion at 30).
77Humane Slaughter Act of 1958. 7 U.S.C. xx1901-1906 (1994). The statute states, \in the case of cattle, calves, horses,
mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock, all animals are [to be] rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an
electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and eective." Id. x1902. The denition of \other livestock" does not include
chickens. 9 C.F.R. x301.2 (qq) (1998).
78Wolfson, McLibel, at 42 (citing, Gail A. Eisnitz, A Pandora's Box of Pathogens, in Slaughterhouse 194 (1997)).
79Id. (citing, Eisnitz at 121, 144).
16some of the animals which are used to produce their food."80 The general proposition that common farming
practices employed by McDonalds, and similar agribusinesses, in the production of food subjected farm
animals to cruel and inhumane treatment according to a reasonable person had undoubtedly been proven.
Although the defendants had armatively proved the truth of their general allegation, the judge felt com-
pelled to condemn in addition to the specic charges claimed by the defendants, numerous additional ex-
amples of McDonalds' cruel common farming practices revealed by the trial's evidence. Even though these
ndings were superuous and not relevant to the ultimate holding, their inclusion validates the extent and
severity of the cruelty found. First, the judge determined that calcium deciencies in battery hens cause
osteopaenia, a leg problem leading to fractures, in both the United States and the United Kingdom.81 Sec-
ond, the judge found the feeding limitations on breeder broilers in the United Kingdom and the United
States cruel, especially since the \birds are bred from a generic strain chosen for its appetite, fast growth,
and heavy weight `for economic reasons.'...The court specically held `the practice of rearing breeders for
appetite, that is to feel especially hungry, and then restricting their feed with the eect of keeping them
hungry, is cruel. It is a well-planned device for prot at the expense of suering of the birds"'82 Third,
the judge found that the \leg problems in these broilers bred for weight gain caused both by their genetic
breeding and crowded conditions in the United States and the United Kingdom caused the birds undue pain
and suering."83 Fourth, the court found the gassing of male chickens by carbon monoxide in the United
Kingdom cruel.84 The judge noted,
80Id. at 42-3 (citing, Opinion at 50).
81Id. at 43 (citing, Opinion at 33-4, 51).
82Id. (citing, Opinion at 16).
83Id. (citing, Opinion at 23-4, 51).
84Id. (citing, Opinion at 13).
17I bear in mind the danger of substituting one's own imagination of what it must be like
to be gassed in this way. I bear in mind that a very young chick's awareness must be
limited...but...as chickens are living creatures we must assume that they can feel pain,
distress and discomfort in some form although we do not know exactly how they feel it.
In my view chicks gassed...do suer signicantly, albeit for a short period, when gassed
by CO2 and when an alternative method of instantaneous killing is available...I nd the
practice cruel.85
Ironically, culling male chickens, which are of no use to the egg industry, by CO2 gassing, continues as
a common farming practice in the United States.86 Fifth, the court found the manner in which broiler
chickens are caught and handled when captured for slaughter in the United Kingdom cruel.87 The Court
noted that the rush to load chickens into the processing drawers leads to handlers grabbing chickens in a
rough fashion, whereupon they are held by one leg, upside down, until the handler has several in each hand.88
The evidence showed that this violent handling often results in the birds hemorrhaging from hip dislocations
and suering broken legs.89 Afterwards, the handlers drop the handfuls of birds into a processing drawer,
where a number of their heads are crushed when the drawer is shut.90 The judge noted that, \[t]his cruelty
was in my judgment compounded by the fact that the bird was already injured...the catching ...had often
been done hurriedly and clumsily under pressure of time, with the result that it has been cruel, in my
view."91 Finally, the judge found the pre-stun electric shocks suered by broiler chickens to render them
immobile and easier to slaughter in the United Kingdom cruel. \McDonalds' own witness, Dr. Gregory,
stated the killing methods for the birds did not comply with governmental codes of practice."92 In the
United States, no federal codes of practice for the killing of poultry exist, and generally, any state protection
is ineective or not enforced.93 Remarkably, the defendants successfully represented themselves pro se; they
86Id. at 44 (citing, Karen Davis, Prison Chickens, Powdered Eggs: An Inside Look at the Poultry Industry 122 (1996)).
87Id. (citing, Opinion at 25).
88Id. (citing, Opinion at 25, 27-8).
89Id. (citing, Opinion at 25).
90Id. (citing, Opinion at 25-6).
91Id. (citing, Opinion at 27-8).
92Id. (citing, Opinion at 28).
93Id.
18were heavily outmatched, produced limited amounts of evidence, and undoubtedly faced many additional
legal disadvantages because of their lack of legal training, and yet, they were able to bring about a judgment
that had yet to be declared before in a court of law, that numerous commonly accepted, customary farming
practices were objectively cruel towards animals. One can only speculate how much more robust the decision
would have been had the defendants had anywhere close to the same resources, nancial support and legal
muscle as the plaintis.
A quintessential facet of McLibel's astonishing holding denouncing a whole host of customary farming prac-
tices was that the judge took a novel approach to dening the term \animal cruelty," an approach that should
have legal implications in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Rejecting both the defendants'
denition, \any practice that caused an animal to suer any degree of stress of discomfort or transitory
pain was necessarily cruel,"94 and the plaintis' suggestions, the judge instead opted for a more reasonable,
objective standard. Of particular note, the plaintis suggested the court adopt the classic agribusiness posi-
tion, termed the `Customary Approach,' which nds that any farming practice in accordance with common
modern farming or slaughter practices, even if it is cruel, acceptable and legal.95 The Customary Approach
is codied in the anticruelty statutes of thirty U.S. states; twenty-ve of which exempt all customary farming
practices, while the remaining states exempt many common farming practices.96 Of particular importance
to U.S. animal cruelty jurisprudence, the judge analyzed and unequivocally rejected the reasoning underlying
U.S. modern statutory approach towards cruelty to animals raised for food, noting that accepting it in this
case, \would be to hand the decision as to what is cruel to the food industry completely, moved as it must
be by economic...considerations."97 Others have condemned the United States' deference to the farming
94Id. at 38 (citing, Opinion at 5).
95Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 135.
96Id. at 135, 138.
97Wolfson, McLibel, at 39 (quoting, Opinion at 5).
19community, revealing the inherent irony that,
[l]egislatures in the United States have endowed agribusiness with complete authority to
decide what is, and is not, cruelty to animals under their care. The majority of states in the
United States have enacted laws mandating that prosecutors, humane enforcement agencies,
and the judiciary cannot examine farming practices for cruelty or animal abuse once the
particular practice is demonstrated to be a customary practice of the United States farming
community. In eect, state legislatures have granted agribusiness a legal license to treat
farm animals as they wish.98
Ultimately, the judge settled on a standard that he felt fairly incorporated the interests of both parties;
one guided by neither blind fanaticism nor political inuence, but rather, common sense. He used his own
judgment to \decide whether a practice is deliberate and whether it causes suciently intensive suering
for a sucient duration of time to be justly described as cruel."99 Even though this standard is subjective
to a certain extent, in that the judge used his \own judgment," \it is undoubtedly preferable to the Cus-
tomary Approach because it provides considerably more objectivity in determining what is a cruel practice.
Most importantly, this determination is made by a judge, a more objective party, rather than the farming
industry."100 The importance of the judge's novel denition of what constitutes animal cruelty should not
be underestimated, especially with respect to relevant U.S. jurisprudence. Most signicantly, the standard
chosen and the decision itself reveal the deplorable deciencies in United States laws that ostensibly protect
animal welfare. The irony, namely that a farming practice can be judged cruel, within the ordinary meaning
of the word, and yet, legal under the law, mandates that serious consideration be given to why our country
claims to care about animal welfare, and yet, almost unequivocally fails to protect the animals we eventually
use for food.
Although the McLibel decision unveiled numerous inhumane animal husbandry practices occurring in the
99Wolfson, McLibel, at 39 (quoting, Opinion at 6).
100Id.
20United States, unfortunately the trial, while extensive, did not aord a comprehensive look at the entire
industry. A range of additional farming practices continue to inict upon the animals we eat widespread pain
and suering, which according to the same standard used in McLibel, or according to almost any rational,
reasonable, objective standard should oend our moral code. Unfortunately, the McLibel decision could not
denounce all the cruel practices that persist in the farming industry due both to the lack of resources on the
defendants' side and, more signicantly, to the fact that the judge found any more evidence superuous, as
sucient proof had been presented to the court to conclude that McDonalds' customary farming practices
treated farm animals cruelly and inhumanely.101
Unfortunately, \farming practices in the United States dictate the fate of the majority of animals that
come into contact with humans."102 Over 9.4 billion animals were killed for food in the United States in
1998, including 41.3 million cattle and calves, 117.2 million pigs, 4.7 million sheep and lambs, 8.5 million
`broiler' chickens, 438 million laying hens, 322 million turkeys, and 25.4 million ducks. The great majority
of these animals are raised under intensive husbandry practices103 resulting in widespread animal cruelty.
When discussing the treatment of such a massive number of animals, \it is hard not to write either in a
droning monotone or somewhat sensationally, but a brief analysis of a few customary practices is necessary
to understand what a simple legal exemption actually achieves in practice. It is not simply [9 billion or so]
animals a year; but it is one, and one, and one, amounting to the large scale mistreatment of individual
animals."104
Agribusiness subjects cattle of all ages to various inhumane farming practices. Day-old calves, for example,
are immediately taken away from their mothers and \transported from the dairy farm before they are able to
walk;" often, as a result, \these calves are \thrown, dragged or trampled."105 Some of these newborn calves
101Id. at 41 (citing, Opinion at 50).
102Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 133.
103Id.
104Id.
105Id. at 134.
21are sent to \calf ranches" where they are raised by the thousands, each conned to a barren wooden crate or,
in less intensive states, the calves are raised individually in small pens or hutches.106 The female dairy calf
newborns are raised to replace their mothers, generally impregnated at 15 months of age, while most of the
males, of no use to the dairy industry, as they will never produce milk, are raised and slaughtered for meat,
but nearly one million of the males are used for veal each year.107 Veal calves, after being taken away from
their mothers immediately, spend approximately sixteen weeks in tiny wooden crates where they cannot turn
around, stretch their legs, or even lie down comfortably, fed only a liquid milk substitute, decient in iron
and ber. 108 The liquid diet suppresses the normal function of the calf's rumen, which makes the calves
anemic, resulting in the light colored esh, prized as veal. As a result of this purposeful neglect, the little
calves develop an insatiable craving for iron. They used to lick any iron ttings they could nd in their
crates, including the metal chains tied around their necks, rusty nails, and, even, and their own urine and
manure, in a desperate attempt to obtain some of the mineral. Now, however, veal vendors have caught onto
the behavior and commonly prevent it by chaining the calves so tightly so they cannot obtain any iron in this
pitiful way.109 The suering endured by these calves should diminish the value of veal, and yet, it remains
one of the most expensive, cherished items at the nest restaurants. However, the tax this treatment should
toll on our social conscience does not factor into the price.
Dairy cows have to give birth in order to start producing milk. Therefore, \dairy cows are forced to have
a calf every year because such a schedule results in maximized milk production and prot. Like human
beings, the cow's gestation period is merely nine months long; thus, giving birth once every twelve months
is physically taxing. The cows' bodies are further stressed, as they are forced to give milk seven out of their
nine months of gestation.110 The instances of dairy cow industry diseases and disorders run rampant. For
106Battered Birds and Crated Herds at 8.
107Id. at 9.
108Id.
109See Animal Legal Defense Fund of Boston v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278 (D. Mass. 1986).
110Id. at 7.
22example, approximately one-half of today's dairy cows suer from mastitis, a bacterial infection in their
udders, which can be fatal in its advanced stage.111
Although the dairy industry is well aware of the cows' health problems and suering asso-
ciated with intensive milk production, it continues to subject cows to even worse abuses in
the name of increased prot. In the early 1990s, the U.S. government was persuaded by the
agricultural industry to approve Bovine Growth Hormone (BGH), an injectable synthetic
hormone. BGH can increase milk production by as much as 25% per cow, placing an ad-
ditional burden on animals who are already pushed beyond their biological limits. Another
side eect of BGH is an increase in birth defects in calves.112
Beef cattle commonly suer from a malady called \cancer eye," where when \[l]eft untreated, the cancer eats
away at the animal's eye and face, eventually producing a crater in the side of the cow's head."113 Most beef
cattle spend the last months of their lives at feedlots, where, \crowded by the thousands into dusty, manure-
laden holding pens...[t]he air is thick and full of harmful bacteria...[where] the animals are at constant
risk for respiratory disease. Feedlot cattle are routinely implanted with growth-promoting hormones, and
they are fed unnaturally rich diets designed to fatten them quickly and protably," resulting in high risk
for metabolic disorders.114 In addition, beef cattle are dehorned, castrated and hot-iron branded without
anesthetic.115 The hot-iron branding of cattle \is extremely traumatic and painful, and the animals bellow
loudly" as ranchers' brands are burned into their esh and hide.116 Another common cattle identication
marking practice, \waddling," consists of a painful procedure of cutting chunks out of the hide that hangs
under the animals' necks, chunks large enough so that ranchers can identify their cattle from a distance.117
Another customary farming practice, in the poultry egg-laying business, is \the disposal of male chicks or
live, unhatched eggs in plastic garbage bags, where they suocate under the weight of other chicks dumped
111Id.
113Id. at 11.
114Id. at 11-12.
115David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 134.
116Battered Birds and Crated Herds at 11.
117Id.
23on top of them."118 In the case of laying hens, after the male chicks are disposed of, it is custom to debeak
the females by the use of hot cauterizing blades119 to stop them from pecking each other and engaging in
cannibalistic behavior resulting from the stress of living in extremely dense living quarters.120 Researchers
analogize the pain felt by chickens during debeaking to that felt by humans who have limbs amputated.121
After debeaking, the chickens are housed in cages, averaging 12-by-20 inches in size, with ve birds per
cage.122 The small size of the cage makes it impossible for the birds to open their wings to full span and
extremely dicult for them to turn around with ease.123 The chickens often spend their entire lives in these
overcrowded cages, the stress of which often causes them to become so aggressive that some end up killing
and eating other birds.124 Another disturbing phenomena about the laying chicken is that their toes often
get caught in the wire bottoms of their cages, and, as a result, their toes actually grow around the wire.
125 These chickens, without any other alternative, repeatedly rub their bellies against the bottoms wires to
groom themselves, resulting in feather loss and painful sores on their bellies.126 In addition, \force molting,"
the starving of laying hens to compel them into the next laying cycle is a common farming practice. When
laying hens are no longer productive, they are slaughtered for human consumption.
In addition to the suering farm animals undergo from various rearing techniques, the last days of their
lives are lled with unspeakable cruelties resulting from inhumane methods of transportation and slaughter.
Approximately nine billion animals are transported to slaughter in the United States each year. Farm
animals suer extreme stress constantly, and hundreds of millions animals endure painful injuries or die
118Fox at 151 (1995) (citing, Singer at 107-108). See also, Wolfson, Beyond the Law at 134.
119Wolfson, Beyond the Law at 134.
120Fox at 151 (citing, Singer at 102, 107).
121Id. (citing, Singer at 101).
122Id. at 152 (citing, Singer 111).
123Id. (quoting, Singer at 111(noting that the chickens' full wing span approximately covers 30 inches)).
124Id. (quoting, Singer at 114).
125Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 134.
126Fox at 152 (citing, H.B. Simonsen et al., Eect of Floor Type and Density on the Integument of Egg-Layers, 59 Poultry
Sci. 2202, 2205-6 (1980)).
24horrible deaths every year in transit to slaughterhouses.127 Overcrowded into huge transportation trucks
and driven vast distances, the animals sometimes trample one another, endure long periods without food or
water, undergo tremendous stress, and face, unprotected, all extremes in weather. In transit, the animals
\may freeze to death in the winter or die of heat prostration in the summer."128 With less than ten horse
slaughterplants in the United States, \a horse's last journey may be hundreds of miles long|sometimes
across national borders. The suering horses experience is compounded because these tall animals are often
transported in livestock trucks designed for other species."129 Pervasive overcrowding, readily acknowledged
as the norm in the livestock industry because the prots generated outweigh the losses, exacerbates the agony
animals endure during transportation. Unfortunately, the economics dictate that conditions not change. It
is cheaper to lose those injured or dead on arrival, than to make their trip more bearable. In addition to
the numerous injuries caused by overcrowding the animals, one hog expert explains, \[d]eath losses during
transport are too high|amounting to more than $8 million per year. But it doesn't take a lot of imagination
to gure out why we load as many hogs on a truck as we do. It's cheaper. So it becomes a moral issue. Is it
right to overload a truck and save $.25 per head in the process, while the over-crowding contributes to the
deaths of 80,000 hogs per year?"130 The answer unfortunately is yes.
The animals' fear during loading and unloading is one of the most stressful parts of the pre-slaughter
experience, \exacerbated by impatient livestock handlers who resort to excessive beating and prodding to
hurry animals along. In some cases, depraved handlers act sadistically, shocking the animals' genetalia with
electric prods."131 Ironically, such abusive handling results in enough meat discarded to feed a large city. As
such, \[t]he livestock industry is losing $46 million annually from bruises on cattle and hogs...Ten percent
of all fed lambs have carcass damage. The most common cause of bruising is grabbing sheep by the wool or
127Battered Birds and Crated Herds at 43.
128Id.
129Id. at 44.
130Id. (quoting Lancaster Farming, October 27, 1990).
131Id.
25by the hind leg."132 Again, the cost of such losses does not outweigh the gain from the eciency that brings
them about.
Millions of slaughter-bound turkeys and chickens die from traumatic injuries caused by rough, careless
handling, while millions of survivors arrive at the slaughterhouses with broken bones or dislocated wings
and leg bones caused by handlers violently grabbing birds by one leg or by one wing.133 Upon arrival to the
slaughterhouse, poultry are either pulled from their crates or the crates are lifted o the truck, usually by
a crane or forklift, and then the birds are dumped onto a conveyor belt, some falling on the ground instead
of the conveyor belt. Slaughterhouse employees, \intent upon `processing' thousands of birds every hour,
don't have the time nor the inclination to pick up individuals who fall through the cracks."134 Often these
fallen birds die under the crush of heavy machinery or vehicles operating nearby or from starvation, exposure
and exhaustion.135 Of those that make it onto the belt, fully conscious birds are hung by their feet from
metal shackles on a moving rail, which takes them to the stunning tank, where the birds are immobilized
by submerging their heads into the electried pool of water.136 With inadequate stunning methods, often
some of the birds proceed to the next station, either fully conscious or unconscious, but still capable of
feeling pain.137 Next, the birds' throats are slashed, usually by a mechanical blade, which inevitably misses
some birds, who then proceed to the nal scalding tank fully conscious to be boiled alive.138 The boiling of
birds alive occurs so regularly, \aecting millions of birds every year, that the industry has a term for these
birds. They are called `redskins."'139 Hog slaughterplants, killing 1,000s of pigs hourly, subject millions
of pigs to a similar boiled alive fate, as inadequate stunning methods fail to render them unconscious.140
132Id. at 45
133Id. at 46
134Id. at 52.
135Id.
136Id. at 52-3.
137Id. at 53.
138Id.
139Id.
140Id. at 54
26\Insucient current will render in a paralyzed hog which will feel everything. In other cases, stunned
animals revive prior to bleeding. Eyewitnesses accounts described incidents where live hogs entered the
scalding tank and were boiled alive."141 Like poultry, cattle stunning techniques, usually a mechanical blow
to the head, are imprecise and inadequate. Inevitably, resulting in conscious cows hanging upside down,
thrashing their legs and struggling to get loose, while a slaughterhouse worker makes another attempt at
rendering them unconscious.142 \Eventually, the animals will be `stuck' in the throat...whether conscious
or not."143 Additionally, slaughterhouses have been reluctant to use the stunning technique on calves, in
particular, since destroying the calves' brains lessons its resale value.144
With increasing consolidation and industrialization occurring, especially in the meat industry, animals suer
immeasurable fear and terror in slaughterhouses, as a growing number of animals die in massive, assembly-
line slaughterplants. \Although `humane' standards exist for the killing of animals, so many are slaughtered,
about 240 each second, it's dicult to ensure each animal a relatively painless death. For some seven billion
animals, because they are poultry, there is no legal protection."145 Animal suering is exacerbated by the
fact that slaughterhouse workers detach from their jobs, becoming numb to animal suering, some even
turning sadistic.146 At cattle slaughterplants, workers, under tremendous stress themselves to keep up with
rushed assembly lines, nd it increasingly dicult to treat animals with any semblance of humanity. \Good
handling is extremely dicult if equipment is `maxed out' all the time. It is impossible to have a good
attitude towards cattle if employees have to constantly over-exert themselves, and thus transfer all that
stress right down to the animals, just to keep up with the line."147
Despite the McLibel holding declaring a whole host of customary farming practices cruel, the continuing
141Id.
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27industrialization of American agriculture coupled with a decient regulatory scheme, create an atmosphere
of virtually complete acquiescence to unspeakable cruelties towards farm animals. Today, every U.S. state
has an anticruelty statutes;148 the majority of which prohibit, at least in part, their application to farm
animals. Thirty states have anticruelty laws that specically exempt all or some farming practices deemed
\normal," \customary," \accepted," or \common," no matter how cruel, twenty-ve of which prohibit their
application to all such farming practices, eighteen of which amended their statutes in the last ten years to
place agribusiness out of their reach.149 This \trend indicates a nationwide perception that it was necessary
to amend anticruelty statutes to avoid their possible application to animals raised for food or food production.
Amendments specically exempting customary husbandry practices indicate that, but for the exemption,
such practices would be determined to be cruel."150 These exemptions create the perverse result of allowing
the corporate, farming industry, whose interests are primarily economic and minimal, if at all, with respect
to animal welfare, to determine what constitutes cruelty towards animals. Moreover, any practice considered
\normal," \customary," \accepted," or \common," no matter how cruel is, by denition, not cruel.
Legislatures have endowed the agribusiness community with complete authority to dene
what is, and is not, cruelty to the animals in their care. Particularly striking is the recently
enacted Idaho statute, which not only states that the anticruelty statute shall not be con-
strued as interfering with accepted practices of animal husbandry or any \other normally
or commonly considered acceptable" practice, but also places enforcement power in the
Department of Agriculture.151
Ironically, these anticruelty statutes, more often than not, immunize farmers from prosecution. For example,
Idaho's statute, not dissimilar to a majority of anticruelty laws, indicates that \normal or commonly accepted
animal husbandry and other practices `shall not be construed to be cruel nor shall they be dened as cruelty to
148Due to the discomfort felt by many drafters and courts in applying criminal sanctions solely on the basis of the welfare of
animals, many \anticruelty laws were justied on the ground that acts of cruelty dulled humanitarian feelings...the legal duty to
animals has been perceived as somewhat indirect, based on `the proposition that we have no duty directly to animals...[s]uch
views are still prevalent in the interpretation of today's anticruelty laws." Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 127-8.
149Id. at 135.
150Id. at 137.
28animals, nor shall any person engaged in these practices, procedures or activities be charged with cruelty."'152
The eect being, if cruel practices are widespread enough or normal, they cannot be prosecuted; the incentive
being, to increase inhumane practices or, at least, not to decrease them.
Ultimately, many of the examples of customary farming practices...constitute cruelty to ani-
mals raised for food..., and state anticruelty states that cover animals raised for food...are
not applied to these practices. It is also clear that a large number of legislatures in the
United States have created legal exemptions to allow such cruelty to continue. In eect,
state legislatures have recognized that without amending anticruelty statutes, many of [these
practices] could be criminal oenses.
By allowing the farming community to dene cruelty to animals in their care, the control of anticruelty laws
as they apply to farm animals has fallen into the hands of those that animal welfare laws traditionally have
sought to punish.153 Given that there is also no civil or criminal federal law governing the treatment of
animals raised for food or food production while on the farm, the sole protection from unnecessary suering
and cruel treatment falls within state criminal anticruelty statutes, and animals within the states that exempt
customary farming practices now have no legal protection from institutionalized cruelty."154
Due to the want of federal protection, state anticruelty statutes, generally govern the treatment of animals
raised for food and food production in the United States. Because of the exemptions that exist in many
states for farm animals and agricultural practices, prosecutors face a daunting task and a myriad of problems
when attempting to protect farm animals from institutionalized cruelty. In addition the disturbing trend in a
majority of U.S. states removing legal protection all together from animals raised for food or food production,
those state anticruelty statutes that do purport to protect farm animals contain substantial ambiguities
and procedural obstacles, rendering them almost entirely useless. Of the states that do apply anticruelty
152Id. at 146 (quoting, Idaho Code xx25-3501, 25-3514(5)(9) (Supp. 1995)).
153The rst anticruelty statutes were enacted to protect animals such as cows, sheep and horses. Id. at 123.
154Id. at 124, 128.
29prohibitions to farming practices, nineteen of them and the District of Columbia \prohibit both depriving
an animal of `necessary substance' and failing to provide `food, water, and shelter. Several states require the
provision of `necessary substance' without further reference to food, water, shelter, and the application of
this phrase varies from state to state."'155 Nearly half the state statutes fail to dene \shelter," even more
so, most require the failure to provide such shelter be proven intentional or cruel.156 It is important to note
that \[p]rovisions for adequate exercise, space, light, ventilation, and clean living conditions for conned
animals are important but infrequent requirements of state anticruelty laws."157 Additionally, statutes often
consist of excessively broad, general terms \with discretion left to the courts to exclude certain animals,
or they specically exclude certain animals, such as fowl."158 Signicant problems and legal hurdles make
enforcement of these statutes nearly impossible. Approximately \half the states have laws that stipulate that
cruelty to animals is an oense only if committed `willfully,' `maliciously,' or `cruelly."'159 Burdens placed so
high, especially considering farms are privately owned, discourage suit. Finally, and perhaps most signicant,
\most laws are not eectively enforced, and enforcement is largely directed at dogs, cats and horses rather
than animals raised for food and food production."160 Further compounding the problem, \[t]he enforcement
of these criminal statutes is typically left to a public prosecutorial agency, itself overwhelmed by human
problems, or to an overburdened private Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) or similar
society, with no private enforcement right."161 Presumably, little incentive exists to prosecute the cases even
in the gravest of circumstances and virtually insurmountable legal obstacles quite often squelch any desire.
In addition, civil enforcement of anticruelty statutes faces almost insurmountable legal standing obstacles.162
155Id. at 128 (citing, Animal Welfare Institute, Animals and Their Legal Rights: A Summary of American Laws From
1641-1990 7-10 (1990)).
156Id. at 128-29 (citing, Animal Welfare Institute at 9).
157Id. at 131 (citing, Animal Welfare Institute at 10).
158Id.
159Id. at 128 (citing, Animal Welfare Institute at 7).
160Id.
161Id. (citing, Steven Wise, Of Farm Animals and Justice, 3 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 191, 206 (1986)).
162Id. \Any attempt to step outside the criminal arena by initiating a civil lawsuit to determine whether [a particular practice
is cruel] would face enormous obstacles. The individual would most likely not satisfy the standing requirement because she has
30A New York court summarized this dismal situation,
[t]he reluctance or inability on the part of the defendant ASPCA...raises serious questions,
vis- a-vis the eectiveness of our present procedure for dealing with allegations of cruelty to
farm animals on the large scale. However, renement or amendment of this procedure is
in the province of the legislature rather than this court...It's ironic that the only voices
unheard in this entire proceeding are those of innocent, defenseless animals.163
As a result, individuals can only view such laws as irrelevant.
Federal laws regulating the treatment of farm animals are eectively nonexistent. Although three ma-
jor federal statutes providing for animals welfare exist, only two pertain to farm animals. Perhaps, the
most signicant piece of federal legislation passed in recent years relating to animals, the Animal Welfare
Act,164 expressly exempts animals raised for food or food production. The Act reads, \the term `ani-
mal'...excludes...farm animal, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry used or intended for use as
food or ber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for improving animal nutrition, breeding, management,
production, eciency, or for improving the quality of food or ber."165 Despite several amendments to the
Act, no explanation exists why Congress has again and again exempted farm animals from its coverage.166
As such, the Animal Welfare Act is irrelevant to the issue of the treatment of farm animals, except for the
important fact that its exemption sends a disturbing message that the welfare of farm animals is inconse-
quential.
By contrast, the Twenty-Eight Hour Law of 1877167 applies to farm animals and \provides that animals
cannot be transported across state lines for more than 28 hours by a `rail carrier, express carrier, or com-
suered no cognizable `injury."' Wolfson, McLibel, at 31.
1647 U.S.C. xx 2131-2159 (1994).
165Id. at x 2132(g).
166Fox at 168 (citing, Becker at 26).
16749 U.S.C. x 80502 (1995).
31mon carrier (except by air or water)' without being unloaded for at least ve hours of rest, watering and
feeding."168 Initially, the law sought to quash public outcry about the shocking treatment of cattle during
transportation. 169 Reports chronicled shipments of cattle across the United States, where animals, after ex-
posure to extreme temperatures in overcrowded vehicles without food and water, arrived at the \stockyards
emaciated, injured, or dead."170 The legislative history also indicates concern for the potential economic
loss suered by the animal's owner when its esh and weight deteriorated from exposure to such extreme
conditions during transportation.171 The statute, however, does not apply to animals transported intrastate,
nor to animals in a vehicle or vessel in which the animals have food, water, space and an opportunity to
rest. In addition, sheep may be conned for an extra eight hours when the 28-hour period ends in the
evening, and \animals may be conned for 36 consecutive hours upon the request of the owner or person
having custody of the animals."172 Remarkably, although the law was designed to ensure animals did not
suer in transport, having not been updated since the advent of trucking, it most likely does not apply to
animals transported by truck.173 This ambiguity renders the law almost entirely irrelevant considering the
vast majority of transportation of farm animals is by truck.174 While it is arguable whether the 28-hour
period is even a humane time limit, especially when compared to the 15-hour British limit and the 8-hour
limit for standard vehicles in the European Community, the federal statute is rarely enforced by the Attorney
General and has no private right of action. 175 Moreover, the statute specically sets its penalty not to
exceed $500, 176 hardly a deterrent. The state humane transportation laws that do exist suer from similar
deciencies as the federal statute and the anticruelty laws already mentioned. Furthermore, some states
168Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 126 (citing, 49 U.S.C. x 80502 (1995)).
169Fox at 159 (citing, Becker at 27; Emily Stewart Leavitt, Animals and their Legal Rights 29-30 (2d ed. 1970)).
170Id. (citing, Becker at 27).
171Id. at 159-60 (citing, United States v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 163 F. 640, 640 (C.C.D. Or. 1908)).
172Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 126 (citing, 49 U.S.C. x 80502 (1995)).
173See Fox at 162 (citing, Becker at 27). See also, Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 126.
174See Fox at 162 (citing, Becker at 27).
175Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 126 (citing, 49 U.S.C. x 80502 (1995)).
176Id.
32specically exempt farm animals from their transportation laws, and some states exempt them generally.177
The only other piece of relevant federal legislation, the Humane Slaughter Act, which requires that live-
stock slaughter \be carried out only by humane methods...[to prevent]...needless suering,"178 fails from
insucient enforcement.179 Under the statute, two humane slaughter practices are approved, either,
(a) all animals are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical,
chemical or other means that is rapid and eective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown,
cast or cut...[or]...(b) by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the
Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the
animal suers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and
instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and handling in
connection with such slaughtering.180
Further, when using the stunning instrument to render the animal insensible to pain, the animal should not
be excited or uncomfortable and the animal should be taken into the stunning area in a manner that limits
such excitement and discomfort, as \accurate placement of stunning equipment is dicult on nervous or
injured animals." 181 Slaughterhouse reports, alone, indicate the lack of proper enforcement of the federal
law.
The Humane Slaughter Act suers from a number of deciencies. It only applies to slaughterhouses under
Federal meat inspection and it specically excludes application to poultry slaughter and possesses a signicant
exemption for ritual slaughter. 182 Therefore, no federal legislation currently exists that provides for the
humane slaughter of poultry. Additionally, the regulation's exemption for ritualistic slaughter has produced
some troubling results. For example, under the laws of kashrut, the animal must be slaughtered with a sharp
knife that \cut[s] the animal's throat severing the arteries, veins, and windpipe in one continuous stroke.
177Id. at 129.
1787 U.S.C. xx 1901-1906 (1994).
179Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 126.
181Id. at 164 (citing, 9 C.F.R. x 313.15(a)(1)-(2) (1995)).
182Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 126.
33In this way, blood drains so quickly from the brain that the animal feels no pain."183 In Jones v. Butz,184
the plainti challenged Kosher ritual slaughter as inhumane. It was conceded in the case that, in practice,
because a Department of Agriculture regulation required that an animal not be put down on the ground
when killed,185 the Jewish slaughter method often involves the animal's being shackled and hoisted before it
lost consciousness.186 In Jones, the plainti objected to the conscious hoisting, as the animal was aware of
its pain. The court, however, disagreed and determined that when Congress enacted the Humane Slaughter
Act, it was fully aware of this method of kosher slaughter and the legislative history indicates the method is
indeed humane under the Act.187
Read logically, the opinion and law set out the following rules: a) \Humane killing" requires
the animal be rendered insensible prior to being shackled and hung upside down for vivi-
section and killing; b) A killing is \inhumane" if a fully aware animal is shackled and hung
upside down before being killed; c) Kosher slaughter requires animals to be shackled and
hung upside down while fully aware; and d) Kosher slaughter is humane.188
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,189 the Supreme Court held, essentially, that the City of Hialeah could
not determine which ritualistic slaughter practices would be allowed. Here the court deferred to Congress'
determination that kosher-type slaughter is humane.
As with the transportation law, the limited reach and ineciency of the Federal Humane Slaughter Act
necessitates that state law govern and insist upon humane slaughter conditions. Presently, 27 states have
humane slaughter laws, nine of which \do not prohibit what is generally recognized as an inhumane method of
stunning before slaughter (the manually operated sledgehammer), and four [Georgia, Kansas, Michigan and
183Catherine Beth Sullivan, Are Kosher Food Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 B.C. Envtl. A. L. Rev. 201, 205 (1993)
(citing, Leo Trepp, Judaism: Development and Life 154 (1966)).
184374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
185Id. at 1290 note 8. See 21 U.S.C. x 610 (1988) (prohibiting as unsanitary the placement of a killed animal on the oor).
186Id.
187Id. at 1291.
189Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
34Ohio] have not even charged an ocial or department with the enforcement of the law."190 Moreover, fteen
states have designated the State Department of Agriculture or the Board of Agriculture, whose primary
purpose is not animal welfare, in charge of enforcement.191 Finally, the penalty for failing to comply with
such state laws averages about $500, with certain states even limiting the maximum ne at $100 or not
specifying any penalty at all.192
In sum, federal laws regulating abuse towards farm animals are essentially illusory, with the three pieces
of federal regulation that purport to protect animal welfare either inapplicable, limited, defective, arguably
inhumane, and largely enforced. No federal law regulates how farm animals are treated on the farm while
being reared. While every state has enacted an animal anticruelty statute (with their own problems), the
federal government has been woefully negligent in prescribing similar protections for farm animals. The
Twenty Eight Hour Law merely limits the time period animals may be transported to twenty-eight hours.
Congress expressly limited the Act's application to transportation, immunizing rearing practices from federal
sanction. The Humane Slaughter Act, while prohibiting the inhumane slaughter of livestock, does nothing to
stop the inhumane slaughter of poultry or the painful handling of ritually slaughtered animals. In addition,
relevant state statutes and anticruelty laws, themselves imperfect and rarely enforced when applicable, fail to
cure the federal deciencies. With its many exemptions, loopholes and inadequacies, the regulatory scheme,
both state and federal, has declared analogous treatment inhumane, but it has been remiss in declaring so
for farm animals. As a result, the laws, in fact, give license to corporate farmers to continue to abuse their
animals without the treat of any eective sanctions.
190Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 130.
191Id.
192Id. at 130-1.
35Ralph Waldo Emerson poignantly captured the manner in which much of American society turns both
a deaf ear and a blind eye to the institutionalized mistreatment and inadequate protection of animals
against unnecessarily cruel animal husbandry practices in the United States when he wrote, \[y]ou have
just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughterhouse is concealed in the graceful distance of miles,
there is complicity."193 Emerson's sentiment is particularly appropriate today, in the wake of an enormous
transition in the United States from a nation comprised of small-scale, local family farms to one dominated
by large-scale, corporate operations, appropriately termed \factory farms." The farming industry inicts a
virtual holocaust on animals raised for food and food production, forcing them to endure needless suering
and pain. Nothing indicates that such cruelties will subside in the future. As such, we must face the moral
dilemma of constantly striving to create an ideal society amidst such cruelties. With other countries nally
addressing this irony and making signicant positive changes,194 the United States lags behind. Our legal
system has failed to extend the shelter of compassion and pity to those animals we eventually eat. Do they
not deserve the same respect as other animals, or possibly even more since we eventually deprive them of
the ultimate freedom, their lives? Does our moral obligation not extend to them? Must they suer so much?
With the main thrust of the Food and Drug Administration, and particularly, the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, being the protection of people not the welfare of animals, and with the FDA's lack of nancial
resources, little hope exists for change. Needless to say, once we recognize that \[l]aws, and enforcement or
observance of laws for the protection of [farm animals] from cruelty are...among the best evidences of the
justice and benevolence of men,"195 only then will we be able to come close to obtaining an ideal society.
193Fox at 145.
194See Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 139-45.
195Wolfson, Beyond the Law, at 151 (quoting, Steven v. State, 3 So. 458 (Miss. 1888).
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